and practice is a product of the western discriminating mind.
However, there have been many western religious thinkers who have most intimately related the two, and indeed almost all the great Christian theologians fall into this category.
Moreover, the fact that the unity of scholarship (Japanese gakumon 学問）and practice (Japanese jissen 実践） has often been stressed in the east is itself evidence that here too the distinction has not been unknown at a secondary or prelimi nary level.
There is indeed a sense in which, and a time at which, such distinctions need to be superseded. However, for the time being it is important to distinguish between thought about religion which is not committed to the promotion of religion (i.e.，"useless" thought about religion), and the involved, creative interpretation of religion which is a kind of religious activity in itself. This distinction is particularly important if we are to share a common approach to the understanding of religion while at the same time maintaining some involvement in distinctive religious traditions.
become increasingly clear that if the word ^phenomenologi-cal" is to be useful in the definition of the methodology of the study of religion, its meaning has to be stated in terms of the requirements of the subject itself.
One of the main concerns of the Dutch phenomenology of religion school was to free the study of religion from the control of Christian theology, which in many cases had，and still has, a distorting influence on the study of religions other than Christianity. The aim was precisely to avoid constructing a theology of religions，however desirable that may also be from the standpoint of Christian theology itself. The question about the ultimate validity of a specific revelation, or about the ulti mate nature of God, etc., was to be bracketed off. Presuppo sitions with regard to such matters were not to control the ongoing procedures of the general study of religion. To a great extent the Dutch writers were successful in this endeavor.
However, in the cases of van der Leeuw and Kristensen, the conceptual framework in terms of which they organized the data of their study still showed a strong dependence on the structures of Christian theology. In this respect I have al ready criticized their work briefly in my book Comparative re ligion} There I tried also to offer a completely neutral con ceptual framework for the phenomenological and comparative study of religion, that is, one not at all controlled by the conceptual content of any one specific religion.
Another concern of the Dutch school was the attempt to grasp the significance of a complex of religious data from the 1 . Comparative religion : An introduction through source materials (Devon : David and Charles, 1972 ; New York : Harper and Row, 1972 ing to grasp its significance for those who believe or participate in it. The combination is difficult to achieve, and demands training and discipline. However, it is quite essential for re ligion to be studied "phenomenologically" in this sense, ii the subject is to develop the world-wide validity it ought to have.
At this level it is possible for studies of religion to be controlled by external criteria, namely by the accounts given by believers or participants themselves, and the examination and assess ment of other scholars. Religion studied phenomenologically, in this sense, is a public subject in its own right. It can be carried on cooperatively by scholars from different countries.
If the term "phenomenological" is useful in the above sense in defining the methodology of the study of religion, it is de sirable to exclude other meanings which have been given to it, but which can just as well be referred to by other terms.
There are four areas to consider.
"Phenomenology" of religion is often loosely identified with "comparative religion， " and the former term has sometimes been preferred on the ground that comparative religion in volves comparative evaluation. However, the comparative study of something does not necessarily involve evaluation.
Just as the term is used in other fields such as education and law，it may be used with respect to religion provided that it is not taken to entail evaluation. Another point to be made about the term "comparative" is that the phenomenological study of religion (in the sense given above) excludes the study introduce functionalist explanations which could easily contra dict that self-understanding. However, such correlations also form part of the study of religion in a broader sense, and they can also be studied comparatively. For example, it is possible to compare relative deprivation and the emergence of new religions in more than one culture. Hence the term "compara tive" has a wider reference than the term "phenomenological."
It should be used in the simple sense of comparing comparable sets of data, whether these are being studied phenomenologi cally or functionally.
Another term used with some frequency is "typology." It means simply the discernment and categorization of recurrent types within a range of otherwise disparate data. Since com parative study also involves a similar operation but covers both phenomenological and functional studies, it might be desirable to reserve the term typology for the designation of types within the data of religion studied phenomenologically. In this case it would not refer to potentially reductionist studies of correla tions with general sociological and psychological data. To put it another way, typology would be a sub-section of comparative religion, namely, that part controlled by the criteria of phe nomenological study. Thus we could speak of a phenomeno logical typology of religion, that is, a study which seeks per sistent patterns within the data of religion while applying the criteria of strictly phenomenological study as defined above.
The "phenomenology of religion" has sometimes been close ly identified with a search for "the essence of religion" (not to be confused with the essence of "a" religion，that is, of a particular religion). Here great caution is needed. The argue whether any such theory is correct or not, but it needs to be pointed out that they go beyond the strict sense in which the term "phehomenological" is useful in the study of religion.
To state it simply, such theories import modes of understand Japanese Journal o f Religious Studies 1/2-3 June-September 1974 ing which go far beyond the self-understanding of particular believers or participants. Even if it were thought that the latter were not contradicted, it becomes impossible to apply the criteria for strictly phenomenological study given above.
The accounts given by believers or participants themselves are simply not of the same order as these far-reaching constructions.
Moreover other scholars can scarcely check and assess their validity without leaping into an acceptance of the same pre suppositions. In so far as some do just this, schools are formed, and that is a bad sign for a public subject. This is not to say that these approaches to depth structures are not extremely interesting and perhaps in some respects valid.
However, the question really belongs to a kind of no-man， sland somewhere between the constructive philosophy of re ligion, theology and its equivalents, and sheer poetry. It is preferable to distinguish such matters from the strictly phenom enological study of religion as defined earlier.
In sum : the term "phenomenology， ' needs to be considered very carefully in relation to the methodology of the study of religion. It has meant many things in the past, and is some times still used to refer vaguely to all of these things. There This, however, is a question which lies outside the scope and method of the subject itself, which may be pursued positivistically by Buddhists, Christians and non-religious persons alike.
Success or failure in the subject are defined by the application
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Problems o f M ethod in the Interpretation o f R eligion of the appropriate criteria, as explained above.
Two frequent and related objections to such an endeavor remain to be noticed. Firstly there is a problem about whether there can be any value-free study of social and cultural phe nomena at all. It should be admitted that it is probably impossible to achieve a one hundred percent value-free study of a religion. However, there is an important difference be tween trying to be value-free and not trying to be value-free.
There is a difference between conscientiously seeking to apply the criteria given above and letting one's imagination roam at will. The study of religion will no doubt always be somewhat inexact and subject to the personal interests of researchers.
Nevertheless it may be possible at least to approximate the objective by submitting one's grasp of the data to the real evidence available and to the control of other researchers and critics.
Secondly it may be thought that even the (very limited) conceptual apparatus of presuppositions offered here is just another piece of western intellectualism and as such already distorts the field in advance by denying what is most important in religion. However， it is probably a mistake nowadays to think of the western mind as some peculiar isolated piece of mechanics, if indeed it ever was. Not only has modern Europe long been subject to oriental influences, it is an oversimplifi cation to think of it as ever having been entirely independent of them. Moreover it is becoming increasingly clear that aspects of so-called "western" rationality also have their counter However，by definition the problem in this sense does not exist for the phenomenological study of religion.
The Interpretation o f Religion
In The necessary distinctions may be expressed as in table 1， in which the vertical columns represent method and the hori zontal columns content.
All the horizontal columns may involve comparative work.
The function and use of religious symbolism needs to be studied both correlationally witn social and psychological factors and phenomenologically. This is because a correlational study The validity of such attempts at joint interpretation cannot be controlled by precise criteria, as they would be creative and evaluative rather than phenomenological However, they would take place on the basis of a preliminary controlled under standing, and hence would be more likely to represent a con sistent move forward-consistent, that is，not merely with the dogmatic postulates of one religious tradition but with the modes of interpretation employed in more than one religious tradition. It is too early to say precisely how such an exer cise would work out in practice, but I believe the time has come when the world cannot do without such a joint approach.
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